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ABSTRACT 
The Dunning-Kruger Effect is a metacognitive phenomenon in which 
individuals who perform poorly on a task believe they performed well, whereas 
individuals who performed very well believe their performance was only average. 
To date, this effect has only been investigated in the context of performance on 
mathematical, logical, or lexical tasks, but has yet to be explored for its 
generalizability in episodic memory task performance. We used a novel method 
to elicit the Dunning-Kruger Effect via a memory test of item and source 
recognition confidence. Participants studied 4 lists of words and were asked to 
make a simple decision about the words (source memory, i.e. Is it manmade? Is 
it alive?). They were later tested on their episodic memory and source memory 
for the words using a five-point recognition confidence scale, while 
electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. After the test, participants were 
asked to estimate the percentile in which they performed compared to other 
students. Participants were separated into four quartiles based on their 
performance accuracy. Results showed that participants in all four groups 
estimated the same percentile for their performance. Participants in the bottom 
25th percentile overestimated their percentile the most, while participants in the 
top 75th percentile slightly under-estimated their percentile, exhibiting the DKE 
and extending its phenomenon into studies of episodic memory. Groups were 
then re-categorized into participants that over-estimated, correctly estimated, and 
under-estimated their percentile estimate. Over-estimators responded 
 iv 
significantly faster than under-estimators when estimating themselves as in the 
top percentile and they responded slower when evaluating themselves as in the 
bottom percentile. EEG first revealed generic scalp-wide differences within-
subjects for all memory judgments as compared to all self-estimates of 
metacognition, indicating an effective sensitivity to task differences. More specific 
differences in late parietal sites were evident between high percentile estimates 
and low percentile estimates. Between-group differences were evident between 
over-estimators and under-estimators when collapsing across all Dunning-Kruger 
responses, which revealed a larger late parietal component (LPC) associated 
with recollection-based processing in under-estimators compared to those of 
over-estimators when assessing their memory judgements. These findings 
suggest that over- and under-estimators use differing cognitive strategies when 
assessing their performance and that under-estimators use less recollection 
when remembering episodic items, thereby revealing that episodic memory 
processes are playing a contributory role in the metacognitive judgments of 
illusory superiority that are characterized by the Dunning-Kruger Effect.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
“…it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows 
something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I 
know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I 
know what I do not know.” 
– Socrates from Apology by Plato, 21d  
 
Background 
 Everyone has their respective strengths and weaknesses, and even the 
most competent expert on a given task is a relative novice on another. One’s 
expertise is largely based upon experience and training but generalizing 
experiences to unfamiliar tasks can elicit overconfidence on one’s performance. 
Overconfidence in one’s skills is a common phenomenon that can happen to 
anyone in varying situations and can lead to an array of problems. 
Overconfidence has been a topic of interest throughout recorded history 
as early as the time of Confucius, who said, “When you know a thing, to hold that 
you know it; and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it; -
this is knowledge.” (Confucius, trans. 1938/500). Since then, other prominent 
figures in history such as Shakespeare have also identified this metacognitive 
illusion of overconfidence (“The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man 
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knows himself to be a fool”) (Shakespeare, 1998/1601, 5.1.2217-2219), and 
Charles Darwin noted that “Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than 
does knowledge” (Darwin, 2009/1871). Believing oneself to possess skills or 
performance that one does not have is the essence of the illusory superiority 
bias. A corollary implied by these observations is that metacognitive illusions are 
bi-directional, such that more situationally-competent individuals tend to also be 
under-confident in estimating their respective abilities or performance. 
Metacognitive illusions of both overconfidence and under-confidence will be 
examined in the current proposal. 
The consequences of exhibiting overconfidence can range from 
inconsequential to disastrous. Occasionally, overconfidence can be relatively 
harmless (though perhaps at times embarrassing), such as discovering a 
teammate’s lack of competence in a group project and helping them finish the 
work together. At other times, the consequences are devastating, such as the 
sinking of the Titanic. Many factors contributed to this tragic event, but a 
significant factor was the overconfidence of the Titanic’s manufacturers and 
captain that the ship was practically unsinkable; this overconfidence led down a 
path claiming over 1500 lives (Bartlett, 2012; Lord, 1955; Lord, 1986). Although 
dire consequences of overconfidence may not occur frequently, being 
overconfident in one’s abilities is a cognition experienced by all people at one 
time or another, and it is wise to minimize such illusions. It is, therefore, important 
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to understand both how these judgments of overconfidence occur and why they 
occur, so that strategies can be devised to help overcome them. 
Empirical studies about overconfidence have been conducted for 
decades. One of the earliest studies of overconfidence was conducted by 
(Adams & Adams, 1960) who found that participants’ confidence in their ability to 
recognize correctly spelled words was higher than their actual accuracy at the 
task. Five years later, Oskamp (1965) found that when clinical psychologists 
were asked to make a diagnosis for a case study, their confidence in their 
decision increased when they were given more information about the case 
although their accuracy did not increase. These instances showed that 
confidence and accuracy were not necessarily correlated in both experimental 
studies and in more practical issues of clinical diagnoses – a finding that has 
persisted in modern research on memory as well (Hirst et al., 2015; Kvavilashvili, 
Mirani, Schlagman, Foley, & Kornbrot, 2009), which will be discussed below.  
Throughout the years, overconfidence as a field continued to be studied in 
many different contexts such as social situations (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & 
Ross, 1990; Vallone, Griffin, Lin, & Ross, 1990), tasks of differing degrees of 
difficulty (Bradley, 1981; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Sen & Boe, 1991), and 
ways to reduce overconfidence (Arkes, Christensen, Lai, & Blumer, 1987; 
Zechmeister, Rusch, & Markell, 1986). In this research, there was a common 
finding of overconfidence in wrong answers (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 
1977; Harvey, 1990; Howell, 1971; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; May, 1986) 
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and a less common finding of under-confident correct answers or top performers 
(Sieber, 1979) as the focus of the research at that time was not the high 
performers. The term “overconfidence effect” developed to describe this pattern 
of higher self-estimates of confidence than ability. Throughout this period, 
though, theoretical frameworks to account for these metacognitive illusions 
remained relatively sparse.  
In 1999, the relationship between of over and under-confidence was 
further characterized by David Dunning and Justin Kruger, who explored 
combining the two effects under one term. In a landmark study, Dunning and 
Kruger conducted several studies showing that bottom performers on a logical 
reasoning task overestimated their task performance scores and that, 
conversely, top performers underestimated their task performance scores. The 
name “The Dunning-Kruger Effect” (DKE) became highly popularized throughout 
mainstream culture and society.  
Generically, the DKE describes a phenomenon in which self-estimates of 
performance on a task and percentile ranking among others also participating in 
the task do not match performance accuracy and actual rank respectively. The 
direction of this mis-match of self-perception extends in both directions (Sieber, 
1979). More specifically, the DKE describes the phenomenon in which poor 
performers on a task tend to overestimate their performance while high 
performers on a task tend to underestimate their performance, but the cognitive 
processes, which lead to these illusory experiences, have yet to be fully explored 
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or understood. The goal of the current proposal is to further investigate the DKE 
by taking physiological measurements of metacognitive judgments at the time 
that DKE estimates are made, as well as to explore group-level differences in 
physiology during the task itself (a cognitive test of memory, see methods) to 
investigate differences in neural activity for performance which may account, 
among over and under estimators. The goal is to provide novel insight into the 
cognitive factors that may underlie this pervasive effect of illusory metacognition. 
These aims will be accomplished using electroencephalography (EEG) to record 
neural activity occurring at the scalp during performance on both an episodic 
memory task and during the estimation judgment about performance on the task. 
This endeavor represents a novel paradigmatic method we have developed for 
measuring the DKE and provides an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding 
of the neurocognitive processes underlying it. 
 
The Dunning-Kruger Effect 
The DKE is a psychological phenomenon described by a mismatch in 
one’s perceived ability and the reality of one’s objective performance on a given 
task, and this appears to be directionally moderated by the factor of ability. Low 
performers (individuals who do not earn high scores on a test using an objective 
scale) tend to overestimate their performance on a task while high performers 
(individuals who earn high scores measured on an objective scale) tend to 
underestimate their performance on the same task. This miscalibration is most 
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often measured using two different questions. The first type of question asks 
participants to estimate their score using an objective scale (objective 
performance estimate). The second type of question tends to ask participants to 
estimate the percentile in which they rank in relation to other students/group of 
individuals participating in the experiment (relative performance estimate). 
Researchers of the DKE generally find that low performers tend to 
overestimate their objective performance on a task, which then inflates their 
subsequent relative performance estimate (Adams & Adams, 1960; Burson, 
Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; 
Oskamp, 1965; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2017; Ryvkin, Krajč, & 
Ortmann, 2012a; C. Sanchez & Dunning, 2018). However, there are some 
different findings about high performers. Dunning and Kruger (1999) found that 
high performers tend to accurately judge their objective score on a task but 
underestimate their relative performance score. They argue that low performers’ 
and high performers’ estimates of their objective score should be rather different. 
Even though low performers judge their raw score to be higher than it is, their 
estimates are not as high as the high performers’ estimates. Because high 
performers perform much better on the task than low performers and they tend to 
estimate their score accurately, their estimates are above even the inflated 
estimates of the low performers. However, other studies have found that high 
performers still underestimate their objective score rather than gauging their 
score accurately (Burson et al., 2006; Pennycook et al., 2017; Schlösser, 
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Dunning, Johnson, & Kruger, 2013) which does not fit Dunning and Kruger’s 
explanation for high performers’ metacognitive errors. Currently, this discrepancy 
has not been resolved.  
Nevertheless, both low and high performers should have similar relative 
estimates of performance. Because high performers underestimate their relative 
score, their estimates decrease and become closer to the low performers’ 
inflated relative estimates. Measuring the relative estimate should provide the 
largest difference between estimated performance and objective rank for both 
high and low performers. This measurement of difference between estimates and 
accuracy will provide the critical measure of the DKE in the current study and is 
why the current proposal will focus on relative performance estimates.  
 Most of the paradigms used to research the DKE in the extant literature 
follow a similar format: participants are given a task such as a series of logical 
reasoning problems or math problems, etc., and after they finish the task in its 
entirety, they are asked to estimate their overall objective score on the task itself 
and/or their relative performance. Thus, the data point for their metacognitive 
judgment is a single data point assessed at the conclusion of the study and it 
represents their aggregated assessment of performance across a great many of 
trial instances. Empirically, this paradigm has been used successfully in many 
different situations to elicit the DKE on such tasks as knowledge of 
microeconomics material on a midterm and final (Ryvkin, Krajč, & Ortmann, 
2012b), knowledge about the University of Chicago (Burson et al., 2006), ability 
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to identify humorous jokes (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), logical reasoning 
(Schlösser et al., 2013), cognitive reflection (Pennycook et al., 2017), size 
judgments (Sanchez, 2016), finance (Atir, Rosenzweig, & Dunning, 2015), and 
computer programming (Critcher & Dunning, 2009). More broadly, the effect has 
been obtained in popular culture contexts of driving (Svenson, 1981) and 
professors rating their own teaching skills (Cross, 1977).  
Variations to the Classic Dunning-Kruger Effect Paradigm 
There have been some deviations from this basic paradigm structure that 
have also elicited a similar effect. Simons (2013) used a priori estimates instead 
of the traditional post hoc estimates by asking participants to play several card 
games of Bridge and to predict each game’s outcome in point value before the 
game had begun. Simons found that low performing players overestimated their 
point value consistently. However, higher performing players also overestimated 
their point value, though not as much as low performers. This experiment 
showed some characteristics of the DKE but differed critically in the placement of 
the DKE estimate questions, which came before completing the card game, 
whereas typical DKE research usually asks the estimate question after the task 
has been completed, and this could have contributed to the unique findings of 
high-performer-overestimation because they have lacked the insight from 
experience of a completed task to help inform their estimates. Nevertheless, the 
discrepancy between the high and low performers still remained in their overall 
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estimates, and the question remains as to what cognitive processes are 
underlying this group-level difference in metacognitive assessments.  
There seems to be an important difference between asking participants to 
make estimates before they complete a task and after they complete a task. 
Asking for an estimate before completing the task speaks more to one’s self-
perception. Before one completes a task, the only information one can draw on is 
preconceived notions about one’s ability from prior experiences. However, this is 
not the core of what the DKE appears to refer to in its canonical form. The 
essence of the DKE is instead characterized by the overconfidence of individuals 
who inaccurately believed that they completed the task well but did not, and the 
inaccurate under-confidence of individuals who believed they did not perform at 
the top but did. These delineations are inherently retrospective in their nature and 
require a different type of cognition and metacognition than future predictions 
(Schacter, 2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Benoit, De Brigard, & 
Szpunar, 2015). For this reason, the current work will seek to focus on data 
acquired by asking for estimates after the task is completed. 
One beneficial innovation offered by Simons’ (2013) study is that it 
introduced an important novel development in paradigms, which motivated the 
current investigation. This paradigm introduced a repeated measures factor for 
the score estimate in the card game that was not present in most of the extant 
literature about overconfidence. Simons’ participants played several games of 
bridge in the same session, and provided estimates before every game. These 
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repeated measurements allowed Simons to assess changes in participants’ 
estimates over a relatively short amount of time. He found that participants did 
not correct their overestimates even after discovering by the end of the game that 
their estimates were in fact too high. This result inspired the repeated measures 
design for the current proposal by providing evidence that participants will not 
self-correct their overestimates even over a short period of time; the procedure 
allows us the flexibility to track changes in individuals’ estimates as well. 
Theoretical Accounts and Models of the Dunning-Kruger Effect 
Dunning and Kruger postulated that the reason for low performer’s 
incorrect estimation for objective performance score is due to meta-ignorance or 
two-fold ignorance (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). This means that poor performers 
are unaware that they are ignorant of the details needed to correctly complete 
the task and that double ignorance bolsters feelings of false superiority 
(Schacter, 2012). More simply, poor performers do not have the knowledge to 
complete the task correctly and because they do not know their answers are 
incorrect, they believe they are performing well. For example, poor performers on 
a task of logical reasoning ability did not have the necessary knowledge to 
answer the questions in the test correctly. They were also unaware that their 
answers were incorrect providing them with false confidence that they answered 
correctly (Schlösser et al., 2013). While this is a very useful behavioral 
description, it does little to advance an understanding of the cognitive processes 
involved in this pervasive illusion.  
 11 
 
Dunning and Kruger also used what they coined “reach-around-
knowledge” to explain low performers’ high confidence in their abilities. The term 
‘reach-around knowledge’ refers to a person’s unique knowledge gained from 
previously participating in a task similar to the presented task and generalizing 
their past experiences to the current situation (Dunning, 2011). Kruger and 
Dunning postulated that participants use reach-around knowledge to help 
achieve their estimation, though this doesn’t necessarily require that it leads 
them to an accurate perception. According to this view, in order to give an 
overestimation, one must first have knowledge about the same or similar tasks 
but not have the knowledge about the details of the task to complete it correctly. 
Having a larger store of reach-around knowledge should therefore increase the 
overestimation of poor performer’s scores. On the contrary, having a smaller 
store of reach-around knowledge should decrease the overestimation of one’s 
abilities resulting in a more accurate performance estimate.  
Dunning and Kruger’s “reach-around-knowledge” account has not yet 
been operationally defined or objectively measured and lacks a substantive 
theoretical foundation in cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, it provides a useful 
platform from which to expand in investigating this phenomenon. The reach-
around-knowledge account provided by Dunning and Kruger refers to changes in 
current behavior based upon prior experience, which is a defining feature of 
memory, and as such it recognizes a key role that memory processes may play 
in contributing to this metacognitive illusion. There is a rich and robust empirical 
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history of memory processes being both theoretically and operationally defined 
and studied. Here, we will focus on the possible role of episodic memory for the 
DKE. Two aspects of episodic memory that may contribute to the DKE are 
familiarity and recollection. These processes align closely with the general 
concepts that Dunning and Kruger attributed to their reach-around-knowledge 
account, and can be drawn upon to approach the DKE in a systematic manner, 
as discussed in the sections below.  
 
Memory Research 
Memory Confidence and Accuracy  
Memory research intersects with the DKE at the point of confidence in 
one’s memories and the accuracy of those memories. A large collection of 
research is available that supports the finding that high confidence does not 
beget high accuracy. Brown and Kulik (1977) lead the charge in studying this 
lack of correlation in the late 1970’s with an article about flashbulb memories. 
Flashbulb memories are defined by a sharp, vivid memory of one’s immediate 
surroundings caused by a surprising, salient, often upsetting incident. Individuals 
who form flashbulb memories have high confidence in the accuracy of those 
memories, almost as if they had taken a mental picture of their environment 
using a camera (old cameras provided flash using a bulb, hence the term 
“flashbulb” memory). Since then, flashbulb memories have been studied using 
major traumatic events such as the 9/11 attacks (Hirst et al., 2015; Kvavilashvili 
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et al., 2009; Shapiro, 2006; Smith, Bibi, & Sheard, 2003), the Challenger space 
shuttle (Bohannon & Symons, 1992; Neisser & Harsch, 1992), and the 2015 
attacks on Paris (Gandolphe & El Haj, 2017). Many of these studies found that 
flashbulb memories were no more accurate than other memories despite the 
participants’ high confidence in their accuracy (Neisser & Harsch, 1992). 
Therefore, the evidence indicates that flashbulb memories are just as susceptible 
to forgetting as normal memories (Hirst et al., 2015) but do not suffer from the 
same decrease in confidence of accuracy as normal memories (Talarico & 
Rubin, 2003).  
Other research has shown that memories can be manipulated and 
distorted. Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978) found that asking participants leading 
questions led them to claim they remembered information that was not actually 
presented to them. Another hallmark study showed evidence that participants 
could be induced to form rich memories of events that never occurred during 
their childhood simply by asking the participant’s close relatives to corroborate 
the false memory (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). These examples show how easily 
memories can be changed, formed, and manipulated. 
Some of the most impactful research on memory failing to correlate with 
accuracy pertains to the legal system (Heaton-Armstrong, Shepherd, 
Gudjonsson, & Wolchover, 2006; Loftus, 1975; Loftus & Zanni, 1975; Nadel & 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2012; Pena, Klemfuss, Loftus, & Mindthoff, 2017; Schacter & 
Loftus, 2013). Pena et al. (2017) conducted research asking participants to make 
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judgments about their accuracy on a memory test for a mock crime observed 
earlier in a study. Interestingly, they found that participants who performed poorly 
on the memory test for details of a mock crime overestimated their memory 
accuracy. Their results were consistent with the results of poor performers 
exhibiting the DKE, suggesting that a link may exist between the two domains of 
memory and illusory superiority.  
Memory Confidence and Familiarity 
Other studies investigating the subtler and more nuanced side of memory 
and accuracy have been conducted using a false fame paradigm. Experiments 
on false fame highlight the idea that familiarity with names can lead to falsely 
recognizing them as famous later (Dywan & Jacoby, 1990; Jacoby, Kelley, 
Brown, & Jasechko, 1989; Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989, 2004). In Jacoby’s 
experiments, participants read a list of non-famous names that they were tested 
on either immediately after reading the list or 24 hours after reading the list. 
Participants who were tested one day later were more likely than participants 
tested immediately to mistakenly judge non-famous names from the previous list 
as famous.  
In addition, participants were presented some non-famous names once 
and some four times. The non-famous names presented four times were less 
likely to be judged as famous due to more recollection of the context (that the list 
of names previously read were non-famous). The names only read once were 
more familiar to the participants, yet not so familiar that they remembered the 
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context surrounding the name. However, this familiarity caused participants to 
believe an ordinary name was famous because they could not recollect the 
context in which the name was presented. These ideas of familiarity and 
recollection are more than just layperson’s terms for differences in memory 
strength; they are cognitive process subsets of episodic memory that have 
garnered substantial research support, and are discussed in detail below. 
Familiarity and Recollection  
The cognitive processes of recollection and familiarity have been featured 
prominently in theoretical models of episodic memory for several decades 
(Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Khoe, Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, & 
Knight, 2000; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Squire, Wixted, & Clark, 2007; Yonelinas, 
1999, 2002). Familiarity refers to having exposure to some material but not being 
able to recall the context in which it was presented. Recollection refers instead to 
recall of specific contextual details from prior episodic experiences.  
Familiarity relates strongly to the false fame effect because seeing a non-
famous name once had the effect of eliciting a similar amount of familiarity as 
mildly famous names that participants many have seen once before (Addante, 
Ranganath, & Yonelinas, 2012; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Jacoby, Kelley, et al., 
1989; Jacoby et al., 2004; Jacoby, Woloshyn, et al., 1989; Woodruff, Hayama, & 
Rugg, 2006; Yu & Rugg, 2010). Importantly, the participants lost the context in 
which the non-famous names were presented and were more likely to judge 
them as famous. The cognitive processes of recollection and familiarity clearly 
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play an important role in accounting for the false fame effect, which has 
implications for a theoretical account of the DKE by way of the shared elements 
of inaccurate perceptual estimate of reality’s performance.  
Physiological measurements using electroencephalography (EEG) have 
also been recorded for familiarity and recollection. Familiarity has been 
associated with event-related potentials (ERP) differences in old and new 
memory trials during a negative-going peak at the mid-frontal scalp sites at 
approximately 400 milliseconds to 600 milliseconds post stimulus, called the mid-
frontal old-new effect, or FN400 (for frontal-N400 effect). On the other hand, 
recollection has been associated with differences between memory conditions 
occurring at a peak in the ERP at the parietal region of the scalp from 
approximately 600 milliseconds to 900 milliseconds, or LPC (Addante et al., 
2012; Leynes et al., 2005; for reviews see Rugg & Curran, 2007; Friedman, 
2013). 
 
Metacognition and Metamemory 
Another way to study inaccurate estimates of performance is through 
behavioral measures of memory confidence of familiarity and recollection, for 
which an extensive literature of research exists (Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas & 
Parks, 2007). Deciding how much confidence one places in their own memory 
can only be done by thinking about one’s memory processes. This term is called 
metacognition and it is used widely to study self-estimates of learning. 
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One way that researchers can study inaccurate estimations of 
performance in the DKE is by taking measurements of metacognition. 
Metacognition is often described as thinking about one’s own cognitive 
processes to become aware of one’s strengths and weaknesses in one’s own 
thinking (Flavell, 1979). Some examples of metacognition are thinking about 
what presentation method most engages you in class and understanding your 
procrastination habits. Thinking about how likely you are to remember a learned 
topic at a later time is an example of a specific subset of metacognition called 
metamemory, described as thinking specifically about one’s memory processes.  
A common method used to study metamemory employs judgments of 
learning (JOLs) and judgments of remembering or knowing. JOLs ask 
participants to judge how confidently they believe they will remember a studied 
item during an upcoming test phase (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991) and judgments of 
remembering or knowing ask participants to judge how confidently they believe 
their memory for that event will be accompanied by contextual details 
(remembering) or without contextual details (knowing). McCabe and Soderstrom 
(2011) gave participants a list of nouns and asked them to make either a JOL (by 
indicating that they would remember or not remember the word) or a judgments 
of remembering or knowing which they termed a “JORK” (by indicating if they 
believed they would recollect, know, or forget the word upon retrieval) during 
encoding. At retrieval, they asked participants to either give a 
remember/know/forget judgment or a studied/not studied judgment. They found 
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that participants who were assigned JORKs during encoding and 
remember/know/forget judgments at retrieval had better accuracy than 
participants assigned to give JOLs and studied/not studied judgments. However, 
the reason these differences exist is still unknown.  
While JORKs ask participants to judge how well they would remember 
contextual details at the time of testing (i.e. the future), it would be informative to 
explore why JORK differences at encoding and remember/know/forget judgment 
differences at retrieval emerge. One possibility is that accuracy may have 
improved for JORKs because the information asked of JORKs is more specific: 
the participant was cued to remember the context surrounding the word. JOLs do 
not offer as many contextual cues as JORKs due to the nature of the simplistic 
task of indicating if the word would be remembered or not. However, that 
simplicity was not guided in any way and the participant may not know what 
stimuli are important to remember as retrieval cues. Because of that simple yet 
broad judgment, JOLs may produce less accurate retrieval than JORKs. 
Similarly, because giving assessments for JOLs lead to less accuracy, if 
participants were asked to give estimates of the retrieval score, their estimates 
may also be less accurate because they cannot recollect the items they 
recognized or the ones they forgot. However, because JORKs lead to more 
accurate recognition, they may provide more accurate estimates. Therefore, 
JOLs could result in overconfidence because of the simplicity of the task 
compared to JORKs.  
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Metamemory has also been studied in conjunction with judgment 
heuristics. Heuristics are mental shortcuts the brain uses to make assumptions 
that lead to quick decisions. One heuristic relevant to metamemory is the fluency 
heuristic, which assumes that information that is processed more quickly has 
higher value, or is more appropriate and applicable to the current question or 
task and will hence influence the decision more heavily (Bruett & Leynes, 2015; 
Jacoby & Brooks, 1984; Leynes & Zish, 2012; Whittlesea & Leboe, 2000, 2003). 
Said more simply, information processed quickly is viewed as more important 
than information processed more slowly.  
Students have been found to use the fluency heuristic to judge how well 
they learned material from a professor (Carpenter, Mickes, Rahman, & 
Fernandez, 2016). In (Carpenter et al., 2016) study, participants were assigned 
to watch one of two videos of a professor giving a lecture in a fluent or disfluent 
manner and then were given a test of the material they learned. In the fluent 
condition, the professor spoke confidently and clearly and was engaged with the 
students while in the disfluent condition, the professor was disengaged, hesitant, 
and did not confidently present the material. Students were then asked to 
estimate their score on the test and indicate how much they believed their 
learning was due to the professor, the material, and their ability to learn.  
The students who rated the professor as being integral to their JOL (27% 
of the fluent condition) earned a significantly lower score than they had estimated 
while students in the disfluent condition (45% of the disfluent condition) correctly 
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estimated their test score. Importantly, however, the amount of learning did not 
differ between the two groups (Carpenter et al., 2016). These findings indicate 
that there can be clear differences in the perception of our learning despite there 
being no differences in actual reality of learning, but these findings leave open 
and unresolved the underlying reason for why this distinction between perception 
and reality occurs in learning and in memory.  
Physiological Measurements of Metacognition 
In addition to studying behavioral responses for JOLs, physiological data 
have also been collected during JOLs using (ERPs) derived from 
electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings. One of the first of these recordings was 
done by Sommer, Heinz, Leuthold, Matt, and Schweinberger (1995). They 
showed participants a list of faces and asked them to make JOLs judging their 
perceived ability to recognize the faces upon retrieval. They found that faces that 
were later correctly recognized showed a positive wave from 300ms to 1000ms 
in the left parietal region of the scalp, much like the LPC. However, this wave did 
not differ between positive and negative JOL conditions (Sommer et al., 1995). 
The authors concluded that JOLs and recognition memory are very closely 
related, which provides support for our hypothesis that memory processes play a 
key role in judgments of self-performance (i.e.: Dunning-Kruger judgments). 
Other ERP studies of JOLs and memory corroborated and expanded upon 
Sommer et al.'s (1995) findings. Müller et al. (2016) conducted an experiment in 
which participants studied pairs of pictures and were prompted to give JOLs after 
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learning each picture pair, assessing the participant’s confidence that they would 
remember one picture given the other picture as a cue upon retrieval. The ERPs 
for the JOL condition and a control condition in which participants did not make 
any JOLs were compared. The pattern of ERPs showed that conditions differed 
reliably on the medial frontal scalp sites from 300 milliseconds (ms) to 700 ms, as 
well as at bilateral negative occipital sites from 350 ms to 700 ms. This negative 
wave is reminiscent of the FN400 that is characteristic of familiarity, which will be 
discussed in more depth in the next section below.  
Another study found evidence of ERPs consistent with recollection and 
familiarity in JOLs. Skavhaug, Wilding, and Donaldson (2010, 2013) asked 
participants to study pairs or two words and provide a JOL about later 
remembering one word of the pair when cued with the other. Then ERPs of items 
with high JOLs and low JOLs were plotted. Although a negative wave was 
present from 400 ms to 600 ms at the fronto-central electrode cites, the wave 
was not significantly different for high JOLs and low JOLs. However, the LPC 
was evident in the centro-parietal electrodes from 550 ms to 1000 ms when high 
and low JOLs were compared with high JOLs exhibiting a larger wave. This 
result suggests that higher JOLs elicited more recollection and that memory may 
also be an integral contributor to these types of self-judgment. 
Together, these studies show that the FN400 and LPC are evident in the 
ERPs during metacognitive judgments, and importantly, also showing that ERPs 
are capable of capturing these sensitive memory processes in metacognitive 
 22 
 
judgements. It also gives support to the idea that familiarity and recollection may 
be a key cognitive process involved in the metacognitive judgments used to form 
Dunning-Kruger estimates by both high and low performers. Although the LPC 
was not evident in Sommer et al.’s study, it is possible that changes in the 
paradigm or analyses account for the difference. 
The results of these studies support the current hypothesis that memory is 
heavily involved in metacognitive judgments about one’s ability to perform well on 
a memory task. Low performers who tend to over-estimate their ability and score 
may do so because of familiarity with previous experiences in similar situations. 
High performers who tend to under-estimate their ability and score may use more 
recollection in their metacognitive judgments. This provides more support for the 
hypothesis that ERPs will be able to capture evidence of familiarity and 
recollection in DKE metacognitive judgements. 
 
A Memory-Based Framework for the Dunning-Kruger Effect 
Many of the accounts of the DKE have focused primarily upon 
interpretations based upon metacognition and competency (Adams & Adams, 
1960; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Oskamp, 1965; 
Pennycook et al., 2017; Ryvkin et al., 2012a; C. Sanchez & Dunning, 2018). 
However, it is very likely that memory experiences in one’s past influencing the 
real-time processing of the current information- either via explicit or implicit 
means- could also be contributing to DKEs.  
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 In episodic memory, theoretical models of recognition are largely 
governed by the dual processes of familiarity and recollection (Diana, Yonelinas, 
& Ranganath, 2008; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Ranganath, 2010; Yonelinas, 
2002; Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 2010) (though see Wixted, 2007 and 
Wixted & Mickes, 2010 for nuanced alternative views), and it is possible that 
understanding of familiarity and recollection processes in memory may help 
explain a proportion of variance in the DKE.  
Recollection is typically operationalized as the declarative retrieval of 
episodic information of both the item and context bound together into a cohesive 
retrieval of the episodic event (for review see Diana et al., 2008), and is usually 
associated with the retrieval of contextual information surrounding the item of the 
event (Addante et al. 2012a; for reviews see Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Yonelinas 
et al. 2010; Ranganath, 2010). The item may however be retrieved without 
recollection and via reliance upon familiarity, typically conceptualized as retrieval 
of an item from a prior episode but without the associated contextual information 
in which it occurred. Familiarity occurs, for instance, when a person can 
remember that someone seems familiar from the past but cannot retrieve who 
the person is or from where they know them. Recollection, on the other hand, 
would be remembering precisely who someone is and how you know them from 
a prior episode of one’s past experience.  
These two memory phenomena have been found to be dissociable 
cognitive processes (Yonelinas, 2002), with dissociable neural substrates in the 
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medial temporal lobes (Ranganath et al., 2004), neuropsychologically dissociable 
among patient impairments (Addante, Ranganath, Olichney, & Yonelinas, 2012; 
Düzel et al., 1999; Mecklinger, von Cramon, & Matthes-von Cramon, 1998), and 
with distinct patterns of electrophysiology at the scalp that is both spatially and 
temporally dissociable in event-related potentials (ERPs) (Addante et al., 2012; 
Curran, 2000; Friedman, 2013; Gherman & Philiastides, 2015; Rugg et al., 1998; 
Rugg & Curran, 2007).  
Based upon the converging literatures from memory and metacognition, a 
viable alternative theory to explain the DKE is that the illusory superiority 
experience may be driven, at least in part, by familiarity from prior experience 
with the tested materials. This general familiarity may lead people to assume 
high performance despite a lack of specific retrieval of the relevant details 
required for real competency with the material. In this view, lacking distinct 
recollection but being generally familiar with material will lead people to assume 
that they are competent and successful, and would be associated with increased 
FN400 amplitudes in ERPs for inaccurate over-estimators. In this case, for 
example, it would be a dangerous combination to have insufficient recollection 
but excessive familiarity with a given topic, stimuli, or information. By contrast, 
under-estimators of self-performance may be marked by having had higher 
recollection of the study material (e.g. competency) such that these instances are 
associated with an LPC, while also leading people to perhaps recollect non-
criterial information that could still be relatively wrong, hence lowering their 
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estimated scores relative to other people. In this case, the excess of recollection 
signal would outweigh the relative noise of uncertain familiarity.  
 
Addressing the Gap in the Current Literature 
There are several gaps in the literature were addressed in this study. First, 
to our knowledge the traditional DKE has never before been elicited during the 
retrieval stage of an episodic memory confidence task. We aimed to bridge this 
gap and identify the DKE using a memory test paradigm in which participants are 
tested on their memory for the words in the test phase using a confidence 
gradient to indicate confidence in their answer. 
 Second, another gap in the literature is that to the best of our knowledge, 
no neurophysiological measures of the DKE have been recorded thus far. This 
gap will be addressed by recording EEG measures of participants during the 
actual metacognitive decisions underlying the DKE. Collecting physiological 
measures of this cognitive illusion is an important element in better 
understanding it and can provide insight into its underpinnings by revealing ERP 
effects that are reliably associated in the cognitive neuroscience literature with 
memory processes such as recollection and familiarity. Additionally, these EEG 
measures can reveal any potential contribution of implicit memory processes that 
could also be influencing the DKE via activation of information unavailable to 
conscious awareness (Addante, 2015; Leynes & Addante, 2016; Rugg et al., 
1998; Wolk et al., 2004; Woodruff, Hayama, & Rugg, 2006; Yu & Rugg, 2010)  
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Third, an additional innovation we will bring to the field of DKE research is 
the paradigm of repeatedly asking participants to provide their performance 
estimates in relation to other students at several times during a single session of 
cognitive task performance. Most DKE literature to date only asks for the 
participants’ performance estimates once, at the end of the task. Although we will 
still also ask for an overall estimate at the end of the study, our novel design of 
repeatedly asking for DKE estimates during the retrieval task will allow us to 
collect numerous samples of neural activity during a single participant’s DKE 
decisions and analyze the brain activity of high and low performers while they are 
making their self-judgments.  
 
Current Study 
The current paradigm has been designed to study the decision-making 
process as it occurs in real-time during DKE relative performance estimates 
provided by participants throughout an item recognition memory test. The DKE is 
characterized in terms of two measures: self-estimates of an objective score on a 
test or task and a relative estimate in relation to their peers. To maintain 
simplicity during a lengthy memory test, the current proposal only asked relative 
performance estimate questions (and not the self-estimate of overall objective 
score) throughout the test phase of the experiment. This approach is consistent 
with prior work by many researchers who also ask for estimates in relation to 
other people (Critcher & Dunning, 2009; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Guillory & 
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Blankson, 2017; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Schlösser et al., 2013). After every ten 
word recognition trials during the test phase, participants were asked to estimate 
in which percentile they believed they were performing up to that point on the 
task. We did not ask for repeated estimates of objective scores on the test 
because the more critical question for the DKE seems to concern the relative 
performance estimate in comparison to one’s peers. 
The current proposal’s hypotheses are focused upon neural activity at the 
moment of metacognitive decisions; accordingly, the current study asked a DKE 
relative performance estimate once every ten slides during the item recognition 
memory test. One of the reasons for such repeated testing is because assessing 
ERPs of the DKE metacognitive decision-making process requires having 
sufficient trials per condition to overcome signal-to-noise ratios, usually a 
minimum of approximately n = 12 trials per condition in each participant 
contributing to group ERP effects. Presenting the Dunning-Kruger question 
interspersed among memory questions after every ten trials was designed as a 
compromise between the need to collect as many trials as possible without 
substantively lengthening the time of the experiment out of concern of fatigue 
effects. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHOD 
Participants 
The total sample of participants consisted of 62 right-handed students free 
from neurological and memory problems recruited from a university in Southern 
California. Five participants’ data were not used due to noncompliance issues 
and one participant did not have usable data due to technical difficulties. Two 
participants did not have usable EEG data but were included in behavioral 
analyses. The majority of our participants were women (N = 48); 56.5% were 
Hispanic, 22.6% were Caucasian, 11.3% were Asian, and 9.7% identified as 
more than one ethnicity of a different ethnicity. The average age of our 
participants was 23.52 years old (SD = 4.82). None of our participants reported 
any visual, medical, or physical issues that would interfere with the experiment. 
Most participants spoke English as their first language (N = 47) and the 15 
participants who indicated speaking a different language first had been speaking 
English for an average of 16.73 years (SD = 4.74). Participants were recruited 
through a combination of methods including advertisements placed around 
campus or through an online recruitment website. Participants recruited through 
advertisements were paid $10 an hour for sessions that lasted approximately 
three hours and participants recruited the website received 8 units of credit. 
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Memory Test Paradigm 
The paradigm used to test our hypotheses and elicit the DKE was a 
modified item recognition confidence test, building from similar paradigms 
successfully used in our lab’s prior research (Addante et al., 2012; Addante, 
Watrous, Yonelinas, Ekstrom, & Ranganath, 2011; Addante, 2015; Addante, de 
Chastelaine, & Rugg, 2015; Addante, Ranganath, Olichney, & Yonelinas, 2012) 
and described in further detail below. This paradigm consisted of an encoding 
phase containing four study sessions, in which participants studied 54 words in 
each session, and a retrieval phase containing six test sessions in which the 
participant’s memory was tested for 54 words in each session. They viewed a 
total of 324 words, 216 of which were presented in the encoding phase and 116 
of which were unstudied (new) items. 
 
Behavioral and Electrophysiological Measures 
 Both behavioral and physiological measurements of the DKE were 
recorded. The behavioral measurements consisted of participants’ responses on 
the memory test. Participants were grouped into quartiles based on their 
percentile score on the test, allowing us to average each group’s responses and 
test them against the other group’s average responses to determine significant 
differences. They were also grouped by errors in percentile estimates; groups of 
over-estimators, correct-estimators, and under-estimators (also referred to as 
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Dunning-Kruger groups later) were constructed to investigate potential 
differences in cognitive strategies.  
Physiological measurements of brain activity were recorded using EEG 
equipment from Brain Vision LLC. All EEG data was processed en masse using 
the ERPLAB toolbox from Matlab (Delorme & Makeig, 2004; Lopez-Calderon & 
Luck, 2014). The EEG data were grouped based on the above categories for 
each type of response, which allowed us to determine if there were significant 
differences in brain activity between our relevant conditions. The EEG data was 
first re-referenced to the average of the mastoid electrodes, passed through a 
high-pass filter at 0.1 hertz as a linear de-trend of drift components, and then 
downsampled to 256 hertz. The EEG data was epoched from 200 milliseconds 
prior to the onset of the stimulus to 1200 milliseconds after the stimulus was 
presented and then categorized based on performance group and response 
accuracy.  
Independent components analysis (ICA) was performed using InfoMax 
techniques in EEGLab (Bell & Sejnowski, 1995) to accomplish artifact correction 
and then the resulting data was individually inspected for artifacts, rejecting trials 
for eye blinks and other aberrant electrode activity. During ERP averaging, trials 
exceeding ERP amplitudes of +/- 250 mV were excluded. Additional filtering, 
such as a 30hz low pass filter, was applied to group ERPs in order to make 
figures correspond to the similar ‘smoothing’ function that the standard process 
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of taking the mean voltage between a given two latencies accomplishes during 
statistical analyses of results. 
Using the ERPLAB toolbox (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014), automatic 
artifact detection for epoched data was also used to identify trials exceeding 
specified voltages, in a series of sequential steps as noted below. Simple Voltage 
Threshold identified and removed any voltage below -100ms. The Step-Like 
Artifact function identified and removed changes of voltage exceeding a specified 
voltage (100uV in this case) within a specified window (200ms), which are 
characteristic of blinks and saccades. The Moving Window Peak-to-Peak 
function is commonly used to identify blinks by finding the difference in amplitude 
between the most negative and most positive points in the defined window 
(200ms) and compared the difference to a specified criterion (100 uV). The 
Blocking and Flatline function identified periods in which the voltage does not 
change amplitude within a specified window (848ms). An automatic blink 
analysis, Blink Rejection (alpha version), used a normalized cross-covariance 
threshold of 0.7 and a blink width of 400ms to identify and remove blinks (Luck, 
2014). Maps of scalp activity were created to assess the topographic distribution 
of the effects.  
In order to maintain sufficient signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), all comparisons 
relied upon including only subjects that met a criterion of having a minimum of 12 
artifact-free ERP trials per condition being contrasted (Addante et al., 2012; 
Gruber and Otten, 2010; Kim et al., 2009; Otten et al., 2006; c.f. Luck, 2014). 
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Procedure 
Participants arrived at the lab and completed consent paperwork and 
demographic information forms via voluntary self-report. The experiment 
consisted of three stages: 1) the encoding phase, 2) EEG set up, 3) and the 
retrieval phase. During the encoding phase, participants were given instructions 
to make a simple decision about the word presented (Figure 1). The participants 
were either asked to judge if the item was manmade or if the item was alive. The 
instructions were presented in one of two counterbalanced orders: ABBA or 
BAAB. The participants viewed four lists of 54 words during the encoding phase.  
The stimuli were presented on a black computer screen in white letters. To 
begin a trial, a screen with a small white cross at the center was presented for 
one of three randomly chosen inter-stimuli-interval (ISI) times: 1 second, 2.5 
seconds, or 3 seconds. Then, the stimulus word appeared in the middle of the 
screen with ‘YES’ presented to the bottom left of the word and ‘NO’ presented to 
the bottom right of the word. The participants indicated their answer by pressing 
buttons corresponding to ‘yes’ and ‘no’ with their index and middle fingers, 
respectively. The response for this screen was self-paced by the participant. 
After the participants responded, they viewed a blank black screen at a random 
duration of 1 second, 2.5 seconds, or 3 seconds. After the blank screen, the 
small white cross appeared at the center of the screen to begin the next trial. 
This cycle continued until all 50 words in the all four lists were presented. 
Between each list, participants were read the instructions for the next task to 
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ensure they correctly switched between the animacy and the manmade decision 
task.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Encoding Paradigm.  
Participants viewed a fixation cross for one of three randomly chosen times and 
then will be presented with the stimuli. After responding ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (to deciding if 
the word is alive or manmade), the participants viewed a blank screen for one of 
three randomly chosen times. After the blank screen, the fixation cross appeared 
again and the cycle repeated until all 54 words were presented.  
 
 
 After the encoding phase was complete, the EEG cap was sized while the 
participant’s face was wiped free of skin oil and/or makeup in preparation for 
attaching ocular electrodes. Five ocular electrodes were applied to the face to 
record electrooculograms (EOG): two above and below the left eye in line with 
the pupil to record electrical activity from vertical eye movements, two on each 
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temple to record electrical activity from horizontal eye movements, and one 
electrode in the middle of the forehead in line horizontally with the electrode 
above the left eye as the ground electrode. Then the EEG cap was placed on the 
participant’s head and prepared for electrical recording. Gel was applied to each 
cap site and impedances were lowered below 15 KOhms via gentle abrasion to 
allow the electrodes to obtain a clear electrical signal. 
 After the EEG cap was in place, the participant began the retrieval phase. 
The participants were read instructions asking them to judge if the stimulus word 
presented was old (studied during the encoding phase) or new (not studied 
before in the encoding phase; Figure 2).  
As in the encoding phase, all stimulus words were presented in white font 
on a black screen. To begin a trial, a screen with a small white cross at the 
center was presented for one of three randomly chosen times: 1 second, 2.5 
seconds, or 3 seconds. Then the participants were presented with a word in the 
middle of the screen, the numbers “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, and “5” evenly spaced 
beneath the word, the word “New” on the left by the number “1”, and the word 
“Old” on the right under the number “5”. Participants pressed any number 
between “1” and “5” to indicate if they confidently believed the word was old (“5”), 
believe the word was old but was not confident (“4”), did not know if the word was 
old or new (“3”), believe the word was new but was not confident (“2”), or 
confidently believed the word was new (“1”). Participants were told to choose the 
response that gave us the most accurate reflection of their memory. 
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Immediately after that decision, they were asked to answer if the word 
came from the animacy decision task or the manmade decision task. The word 
and numbers remained on the screen but this time, word “Alive” was presented 
on the left by the number “1”, and the word “Manmade” was presented on the 
right under the number “5”. Participants were told to choose the response that 
gave us the most accurate reflection of their memory and could respond that they 
confidently believed the word was from the animacy task (“1”), believed the word 
was from the animacy task but were not confident (“2”), did not know the source 
of the word or had replied in the question directly before that the word was new 
(“3”), believed the word was from the manmade task but were not confident (“4”), 
or confidently believed the word was from the manmade task (“5”). After that, a 
blank black screen was presented for a randomly chosen time of 1 second, 2.5 
seconds, or 3 seconds. Participants were instructed to blink only during this blank 
screen and avoid blinking during the screens with a small cross or stimuli. The 
white cross was presented after the blank screen and the cycle continued until 
after the 10th word has been presented.  
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Figure 2. Retrieval Paradigm.  
Participants viewed a fixation cross for one of three randomly chosen times. 
Then participants viewed the stimulus and indicated their confidence for the item 
memory and source memory. Then participants viewed a blank screen for one of 
three randomly chosen times and then the fixation cross appeared again 
continuing the cycle. For every 10th stimulus presented, the participants viewed 
the Dunning-Kruger Estimate asking participants to estimate the percentile in 
which they believed they were performing up to that point on the task in relation 
to other students.  
 
 
After each 10th word presented, the Dunning-Kruger estimate was 
presented. Participants received instructions asking them to estimate the 
percentile in which they believed they were performing up to that point in the test 
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compared to other students who would participate in the study. During the test 
phase, the word “Percentile?” was presented as a prompt for their estimate with 
the numbers “<60%,”, “60’s”, “70’s”, “80’s”, and “90%+” evenly spaced beneath it. 
The Dunning-Kruger estimate was participant-paced. After the participant 
responded, the blank screen was presented and the next cycle of ten words were 
presented.  
Six lists of 54 words were presented during the retrieval phase, each with 
five DKE questions interspersed (after trials 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50). After the last 
list of 54 words was presented, participants answered four Dunning-Kruger post-
test questions asking them to estimate their objective score on the whole test, 
their relative percentile on the whole test, how good their memory is in everyday 
life, and the overall difficulty of the test. 
 
Dunning-Kruger Post-Test Questions 
At the conclusion of the memory retrieval test, participants were asked two 
additional questions concerning the DKE (Figure 3). First, they were asked to 
“Estimate your score on the whole test”. Participants were prompted to respond 
on a 5-point scale with “1” meaning below 60%, “2” meaning between 60 and 
69%, “3” meaning between 70 and 79%, “4” meaning between 80 and 89 
percent, and “5” meaning above 90%. The following scale was shown evenly 
spaced below each prompt: “<60%,”, “60’s”, “70’s”, “80’s”, and “90%+”. The 
second questions they were asked was the following: “In what percentile did you 
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perform on the whole test?”. The participants were prompted to respond on a 5-
point scale with “1” meaning below the 60th percentile, “2” meaning between the 
60th and 69th percentile, “3” meaning between the 70th and 79th percentile, “4” 
meaning between 80th and 89th percentile, and “5” meaning in the 90th percentile 
or above. The following scale will be shown evenly spaced below each prompt: 
“<60%,”, “60’s”, “70’s”, “80’s”, and “90%+”.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Post-Test Dunning-Kruger Questions.  
Participants were asked four questions at the end of the study and responded on 
a five-point scale with the descriptions seen above. 
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The first questions measured perceived objective score on the entire 
memory test while the second question measured perceived relative score in 
relation to other students taking the memory test. These post-test prompts 
allowed us to test for the DKE at a between-subjects level to be sure the effect 
can be elicited using an episodic memory task. 
Two additional post-test questions were also asked: 1) “Rate your memory 
in everyday life” and 2) “How difficult was this entire test?”. For the first question, 
participants responded on a 5-point scale with “1” meaning very hard, “2” 
meaning hard, “3” meaning moderate, “4” meaning easy, and “5” meaning very 
easy. For the second prompt, participants responded on a 5-point scale with “1” 
meaning very bad, “2” meaning bad, “3” meaning moderate, “4” meaning good, 
and “5” meaning very good. These questions may be used as covariates in later 
analyses (Figure 3 above). 
Hypotheses 
 The hypotheses for the current study are the following: 
1. Low performers will significantly overestimate their relative percentile while 
high performers will underestimate their relative percentile on the post-test 
Dunning-Kruger questions. 
2. A larger FN400 will be evident in the group level ERPs for low performers 
compared to high performers for the in-test Dunning-Kruger questions at 
the mid-frontal electrode sites from approximately 400 ms to 600ms. 
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3. A larger LPC will be evident in the group level ERPs for high performers 
compared to low performers for the relative post-test Dunning-Kruger 
questions at the left parietal electrode sites at approximately 600 ms to 
900 ms. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS 
Behavioral Results 
Episodic Memory 
We excluded a total of five participants from behavioral analysis. Four 
were excluded due to non-compliance issues while one was excluded for 
technical difficulties during the experiment.  
Item Memory Performance. Recognition memory response distributions 
for recognition of old and new items are displayed in Table 1. Item recognition 
accuracy was calculated as the proportion of hits (M = .81, SD = .11) – proportion 
of false alarms (M = .24, SD = .14) (i.e. pHit-pFA). Participants performed item 
recognition at relatively high levels (M = .57, SD = .15) which was greater than 
chance, t(55) = 3.59, p < .001. In addition, participants’ accuracy for high 
confidence item recognition trials (‘5’s’) was significantly greater than low 
confidence item recognition trials (‘4’s’), t(55) = 9.04, p < .001. 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Responses for Each Item Response as a Proportion of All 
Memory Responses 
Item Recognition Confidence 1 2 3 4 5 
All Old Items .09 .07 .04 .21 .60 
All New Items .43 .23 .10 .15 .08 
Animacy Task .13 .06 .04 .16 .60 
Manmade Task .08 .04 .03 .14 .71 
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Source Memory Performance. Source memory response distributions for 
recognition of old and new items are displayed in Table 2. Source memory 
accuracy values were collapsed to include high and low source confidence 
responses which were then divided by the sum of items receiving a correct and 
incorrect source response to calculate the proportion. (Addante et al., 2012a, 
2012b; Roberts et al., 2018). Mean accuracy for source memory was .30 (SD 
= .19) and was reliably greater than chance, t(55) = 11.78, p < .001. 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Responses for Each Source Response as a Proportion of 
All Memory Responses 
Source Recognition Confidence 1 2 3 4 5 
All Old Items .14 .14 .22 .17 .33 
All New Items .05 .08 .70 .09 .08 
Animacy Task .24 .17 .27 .16 .16 
Manmade Task .11 .11 .17 .2 .41 
 
 
We also assessed the extent to which the current results could replicate 
and extend source memory findings for differences among high and low 
confidence item judgements that were reported by Addante et al., 2012a, since 
that was a novel phenomenon which benefits from external validity of the 
literature. When assessing source memory for each level of item hit responses, 
participants’ accuracy for low confidence item recognition trials (‘4’s’) (M = .51, 
SD = .24), t(55) = 15.78, p < .001) and high confidence item recognition trials 
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(‘5’s’) (M = .68, SD = .10), t(55) = 50.54, p < .001) were each significantly greater 
than chance, and reliably different from each other (t(55) = 5.33, p < .001). Of 
note for this finding is that it replicated the prior findings of these unique condition 
comparisons, extends this with a data set that was double the sample size of the 
preceding work, and in a paradigm which permits assessing reaction times 
associated with the cognitive processes supporting these source memory 
judgements (see results below).  
Accuracy for Item and Source Memory Combinations. The current 
memory paradigm was adapted from prior work that reported uniquely different 
response accuracies for correct source judgements that were preceded by high 
and low levels of item recognition confidence hits (Addante et al., 2012). In order 
to assess the extent to which those novel findings could be replicated with a 
larger sample size and extended by assessing response time differences, the 
same analysis was performed on the current data. Accuracy for high confidence 
item judgments with low confidence source judgments (M = 0.68, SD = .10) was 
more accurate than low confidence item judgments with low confidence source 
judgments (M = 0.51, SD = 0.24), t(55) = 5.33, p < .001. The accuracy for both 
the high confidence item judgments with low confidence source judgments and 
the low confidence item judgments with low confidence source judgments were 
each significantly greater than chance (t(55) = 50.54, p < .001; t(55) = 15.78, p 
< .001, respectively).  
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Response Speed for Episodic Memory Judgments 
Reaction times for each item response are shown in Table 3 while 
reaction times for each source response are shown in Table 4. Because paired t-
test were conducted to investigate differences in response speeds within each 
individual, participants were excluded from analysis if they did not have 
responses in both of the comparisons. Participants responded significantly faster 
when identifying hits than misses, t(55) = -6.23, p < .001, false alarms, t(55) = -
4.43, p < .001, and correct rejections, t(55) = -3.52, p < .001. They also 
responded significantly faster when identifying correct rejections than misses, 
t(55) = 3.40, p = .001, and misses to false alarms, t(55) = 2.24, p = .03. There 
were no significant differences between the reaction times for false alarms and 
correct rejections, t(55) = 0.93, p = .35. 
 
 
Table 3. Average Reaction Times for Each Item Memory Response 
Item Reaction 
Times 1 2 3 4 5 
All Old Items 
2547 
(1067) 
3295 
(1534) 
3151 
(1678) 
2682 
(752) 
1852 
(394) 
All New Items 
2205 
(671) 
3014 
(1200) 
2897 
(1858) 
2999 
(868) 
2085 
(820) 
Animacy Task 
2451 
(990) 
3355 
(1128) 
3376 
(1352) 
2732 
(976) 
1853 
(378) 
Manmade Task 
2470 
(782) 
3425 
(1369) 
3254 
(1391) 
2947 
(1174) 
1765 
(339) 
Note. Values are in milliseconds with standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Average Reaction Times for Each Source Memory Response 
Source 
Reaction Times 
1 2 3 4 5 
All Old Items 
2168 
(1193) 
2258 
(1084) 
1589 
(802) 
2189 
(1066) 
1776 
(827) 
All New Items 
1615 
(1106) 
2295 
(1135) 
913 
(516) 
2043 
(1034) 
1488 
(998) 
Animacy Task 
1791 
(742) 
2428 
(1084) 
1366 
(1039) 
2274 
(1194) 
1744 
(967 
Manmade Task 
1961 
(951) 
2477 
(1089) 
1405 
(1079) 
2216 
(981) 
1635 
(785) 
Note. Values are in milliseconds with standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
In addition, participants responded significantly faster to high confidence 
item recognition trials (M = 1897 ms, SD = 397 ms) than low confidence item 
recognition trials (M = 2834 ms, SD = 1032 ms), t(49) = -8.10, p < .001. This 
finding persisted even when source memory was held constant, comparing low 
confidence item judgments with low confidence source judgments (M = 2833 ms, 
SD = 1109 ms) to high confidence item judgments with low confidence source 
judgments (M = 1950 ms, SD = 617 ms), t(47) = 6.96, p < .001 (Figure 4).  
Differences observed in reaction time for items in which the source was correct 
(M = 2322 ms, SD = 589 ms) and items for which the source was incorrect (M = 
2475 ms, SD = 654 ms) approached significance but did not reach the threshold 
of significance, t(54) = -1.77, p = .08 (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Response Times for Item Recognition Judgments for Specific Item and 
Source Memory Conditions.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
 
Dunning-Kruger Response Judgments 
The distribution of responses for each Dunning-Kruger response category for the 
post-test and in-test Dunning-Kruger responses are shown in Table 5. When 
plotted against actual performance, results from subjects’ reported performance 
estimates revealed that the canonical Dunning-Kruger Effect was evident in the 
dataset, thereby replicating the DKE and extending it to our episodic memory 
paradigm (Figure 5).  
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Table 5. Distribution of Responses for Each Dunning-Kruger Response, as a 
Proportion of All Dunning-Kruger Responses 
DKE Type <60% 60-69% 70-79% 80-89% >90% 
In-Test DK Responses .05 .20 .39 .29 .07 
Post-Test DK Responses .02 .11 .54 .30 .04 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Actual Percentile and Estimated Percentile by Quartile.  
Participants were separated by their actual percentile ranking. The low group 
consists of those in the first quartile (less than or equal to 25%), the second 
group consists of those in the second quartile (>25% and <=50%), the third group 
consists of those in the third quartile (>50% and <=75%), and the high group 
consists of those in fourth quartile (>75%). Participants who performed in the first 
quartile showed the most overestimation while participants who performed in the 
fourth quartile showed underestimation of their actual percentile. 
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First, the participants were split into quartiles based on memory accuracy. 
Average memory test accuracy by quartile and each quartile’s average post-test 
Dunning-Kruger response is listed in Table 6.  
 
 
Table 6. Average Recognition Memory Test Accuracy and Average Post-Test 
and In-Test Dunning-Kruger Relative Response by Quartile 
Quartile Accuracy 
Average Post-Test 
DK Relative 
Response 
Average In-Test 
DK Relative 
Response 
Top (N = 14) .74 (.06) 3.50 (0.65) 3.26 (0.73) 
3rd (N = 14) .62 (.02) 3.29 (0.99) 3.33 (1.01) 
2nd (N = 14) .55 (.04) 2.79 (0.80) 2.79 (0.81) 
Bottom (N = 14) .38 (.08) 3.43 (0.51) 3.17 (0.62) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
In order to be able to directly compare participants’ post-test relative 
Dunning-Kruger estimate and their actual percentile, participants’ percentile 
ranking made from their accuracy on the memory test was converted to the 5-
point scale of percentile estimates that were used both in-test during the retrieval 
task and at the end of the experiment. A difference score for each participant’s 
percentile ranking was calculated by subtracting their post-test relative Dunning-
Kruger estimate from their converted percentile ranking mentioned above. The 
bottom quartile (M = 2.43, SD = 0.51, t(26) = 17.69, p < .001), 2nd quartile (M = 
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1.79, SD = 0.80, t(26) = 8.33, p < .001), and 3rd quartile (M = 1.43, SD = 1.28, 
t(26) = 4.16, p < .001) significantly overestimated their percentile ranking while 
the top quartile significantly underestimated their percentile ranking (M = -0.79, 
SD = 0.89, t(26) = -3.29, p = .003) (Figure 6).  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Average Difference Score by Quartile.  
Difference score is calculated by subtracting the converted percentile ranking 
from the estimated post-test relative score. The bars show the magnitude of 
overestimation above the x-axis and underestimation below the x-axis for each of 
the groups. The 2nd and 3rd quartile groups were combined because the groups 
were not significantly different. Participants in the first quartile and the 2nd & 3rd 
quartile both overestimated their percentile significantly and were significantly 
different from each other. Participants in the fourth quartile underestimated their 
percentile significantly and were significantly different than the low percentile and 
the 2nd & 3rd percentile. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, † = p < .10. 
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However, a t-test revealed that the difference scores of the 2nd quartile 
and the 3rd quartile were not significantly different, t(26) = 0.88, p = .39, and so 
these were combined. The combined 2nd and 3rd quartile group was still 
significantly overestimated their percentile ranking (M = 1.61, SD = 1.07, t(54) = 
7.98, p < .001). On average, the difference score for the top quartile was 
significantly different than the score for the bottom quartile (t(26) = 11.68, p 
< .001) and the combined 2nd+3rd quartiles (t(340) = 7.22, p < .001). The 
difference score for the bottom quartile was also significantly different than the 
score for the 2nd and 3rd quartiles (t(38) = 2.93, p = .01).The magnitude of the 
errors made by each group decreased as percentile increased: the bottom 
quartile overestimated their percentile by 62.56%, the 2nd quartile overestimated 
by 37.95%, the 3rd quartile overestimated by 14.56%, and the top quartile 
underestimated by 8.30% (Figure 5). This basic finding provides evidence that 
the DKE was elicited by our memory paradigm in a way that has not been shown 
before to our knowledge. This result extends the DKE to episodic memory.  
In order to better investigate differences in cognitive strategies, 
participants were separated into groups based on estimation accuracy instead of 
percentile ranking based upon their post-test estimates of their relative 
performance on the memory test.1  
                                                 
1 We used the post-test relative Dunning-Kruger estimate to create groups of over-estimators (N = 
38), correct-estimators (N = 8), and under-estimators (N = 10), although we also conducted a 
paired t-test between the average of the in-test Dunning-Kruger responses (M = 3.14, SD = 0.81) 
for each person to the post-test relative Dunning-Kruger response (M = 3.16, SD = 0.78) and 
found that the two scores did not differ, t(55) = 1.30, p = .20, justifying the decision to use the 
post-test relative Dunning-Kruger response to separate our groups. 
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Response Speeds for Dunning-Kruger Judgments 
Differences in reaction times for each Dunning-Kruger response were also 
analyzed, using a t-test between groups. There were no significant differences in 
reaction times collapsed across all Dunning-Kruger responses between the three 
estimator groups (over-estimators vs under-estimators: t(44) = 0.17, p = .87, 
over-estimators vs correct-estimator: t(42) = -0.81, p = .42, under-estimators vs 
correct-estimators: t(16) = -0.76, p = .46).  
Reaction times were then analyzed by response number to investigate 
any differences in specific responses. Over-estimators’ reaction times when 
rating themselves in the 90th percentile or above (response of ‘5’, N = 13) were 
found to be significantly faster (M = 1656 ms, SD = 544 ms) than under-
estimators’ reaction times (M = 2578 ms, SD = 827 ms) of the same judgement, 
t(14) = -2.43, p = .03 (Figure 7). That is, people who over-estimated their abilities 
were also responding faster when they believed they were doing the best, as 
opposed to the slower responding of people who were under-estimating their 
abilities. 
Our sample size for the under-estimator group contained only three 
people, and though the current paradigm has been previously established as 
being sensitive to small sample sizes of three for memory and EEG related 
effects (Addante et al, 2012; Addante, 2015) we still wanted to be conscientious 
of possible issues related to small sample sizes in the DKE measure. Therefore, 
we also collapsed that group with the additional group of correct-estimators (N = 
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2) to create a more generic larger group (N=5). Over-estimators were still 
significantly faster than our collapsed generic group (M = 2457 ms, SD = 634 ms; 
t(18) = -2.56, p = .02) when responding that they thought they were doing the 
best (i.e. in the 90th percentile or above). The reaction times for over-estimators 
(N = 10) when rating themselves less than the 60th percentile (response ‘1’; M = 
2204 ms, SD = 628 ms) were significantly slower than when over-estimators 
rated themselves in 90th percentile or above (DK response of ‘5’; M = 1656 ms, 
SD = 544 ms, N = 13), t(21) = 2.24, p = .04. 
We next conducted a t-test between over-estimators (M = 2178 ms, SD = 
602 ms, N = 11) and the combined group of correct- and under-estimators (M = 
1604 ms, SD = 330 ms, N = 3) rating themselves in the 59th percentile or lower 
but there were no significant differences between their reaction times, t(12) = 
1.56, p = .15, very possibly due to low sample size. Every other comparison of 
reaction times for responses of ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’, and ‘5’ were not significantly 
different between under-estimators and over-estimators (Table 7 for data).  
One other effect involving reaction time emerged that was marginally 
significant based upon standard thresholds. The combined group of correct + 
under-estimators exhibited reaction times with the opposite pattern showing a 
slower average response time when rating themselves in the 90th percentile or 
above (M = 2457 ms, SD = 634 ms, N = 5) and a faster mean reaction time when 
rating themselves less than the 60th percentile (M = 1604 ms, SD = 329 ms, N = 
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3; t(6) = -2.12, p = .08). These marginal effects may be due to the low sample 
size in these groups (Figure 7). 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean Reaction Times of High and Low Percentile Estimation by 
Dunning-Kruger Groups.  
Performing in the 59th percentile or below corresponds to response 1 on the task 
and performing in the 90th percentile or above corresponds to response 5. The 
reaction times are separated by over-estimators and the combined group of 
correct- and under-estimators. Mean reaction times are reported in ms. * = p 
< .05., † = p < .10. 
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Table 7. Response Distribution Proportions of Dunning-Kruger 
Responses and Mean Reaction Times, Standard Deviations, and 
Sample Size for In-Test Dunning-Kruger Judgments by Estimator 
Group 
Group 
Dunning-Kruger 
Judgments 
1 2 3 4 5 
Over-Estimators 
Response 
Distribution 
.05 .19 .39 .28 .09 
(n = 36) Reaction Time 2204 2064 1948 2044 1656 
  SD 628 641 644 860 544 
 N per Response 10 23 33 27 13 
Correct-
Estimators 
Response 
Distribution 
.09 .28 .33 .25 .05 
(n = 8) Reaction Time 1447 2323 2018 1920 2275 
  SD 263 987 890 733 360 
 N per Response 2 6 7 5 2 
Under-
Estimators 
Response 
Distribution 
.01 .21 .35 .38 .05 
(n = 10)  Reaction Time 1918 2074 2166 1996 2579 
  SD -- 1249 543 770 478 
 N per Response 1 5 9 9 3 
Combined 
Correct- and 
Under-
Estimators 
Response 
Distribution 
.04 .24 .34 .32 .05 
(n = 18) Reaction Time 1604 2209 2101 1969 2457 
  SD 330 1062 693 729 635 
 N per Response 3 11 16 14 5 
Note. Means and SD are in milliseconds. 
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Electrophysiological Results  
Recognition Memory 
Recognition memory was analyzed by comparing the physiology of ERPs 
for correctly identified old items (hits: responses of ‘4’ and ‘5’) to correctly 
identified new items (correct rejections: responses of ‘1’ and ‘2’). The scalp 
topographic maps for the item recognition difference wave (Hits - Correct 
Rejections) for every 200 ms are shown in Figure 8. A central positive effect 
(shown by warmers colors on the map) is evident beginning at 400-600ms. To 
establish the consistency of the current study’s effects with those of prior studies 
using the same memory paradigm, we analyzed this FN400 effect at the same 
Cz site as reported in Addante et al. (2012a); it was found to be a reliable effect 
at Cz (t(54) = 3.80, p < .001) but was also significant at several adjacent 
electrode sites, such as Pz (t(54) = 3.41, p = .001).  
Consistent with prior findings on ERPs of recognition memory, this FN400 
effect was then found to then shift towards the left parietal region during later 
latencies of 600-800ms, exhibiting maximal effects at the same left parietal site of 
CP5 reported in Addante et al., (2012a) (i.e. demonstrating the LPC effect, for 
reviews see Rugg & Curran, 2007; Friedman, 2013).  
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Figure 8. Event-Related Potentials for Recognition Memory.  
a) Topographic maps of hits compared to correct rejections for every 200 ms 
interval. b) Cz shows an FN400 from 400ms to 600ms. c) CP5 shows an LPC 
from 600ms to 800ms, consistent with replicating prior findings in this memory 
paradigm (Addante et al., 2012a, 2012b). Mean ERP amplitudes for hits 
compared to correct rejection from d) 400-600 ms and e) 600-800ms. Compare 
to Addante et al., (2012), Neuroimage. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
 
To assess the consistency with and replicability of similar 
neuropsychological findings reported of small samples (N = 3 and N = 6) while 
with the same paradigm (Addante et al., 2012b) we also compared item hits that 
were successfully recognized with low confidence (item response of ‘4’; M = -
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5.13, SD = 0.66) to those hits that were recognized with high confidence 
(response ‘5’; M = -4.28, SD = 0.64). This revealed the same pattern of FN400 
effects at mid-frontal sites (Fc1) from 400-600 ms (t(34) = 2.69, p = .01) and LPC 
effects at left parietal site (P3) from 600-900ms as was reported among 
hippocampal amnesia patients and controls by Addante et al., (2012b) t(34) = 
3.21, p = .003 (low confidence hits: M = 0.59, SD = 0.48; high confidence hits: M 
= -0.41, SD = 0.42; Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9. Event-Related Potentials for High Confidence Recognition and Low 
Confidence Recognition.  
Topographic maps of high confidence item hits compared to low confidence item 
hits from a) 400-600 ms and b) 600-800 ms. Maps are range normalized with 
warmer colors indicating more positive differences in voltage. ERPs of high and 
low confidence recognition items at electrode sites c) FC1 and d) P3. The 
dashed box indicates latencies that represent significant differences in ERP 
amplitude. Mean ERP amplitude differences are shown at electrode site e) FC1 
from 400-600 ms and f) P3 from 600-900ms. Compare to prior findings of 
Addante, et al., (2012), Neuropsychologia. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Source Memory 
ERPs for source memory were analyzed by comparing judgments of both 
correct and incorrect source memory responses as compared to correct 
rejections. For source correct judgments, an FN400 effect was evident from 400-
600 ms at Cz, again replicating findings from prior studies (Addante et al., 2012), 
t(54) = 3.97, p < .001. During later latencies of 600-800 ms, correct source 
judgments elicited the canonical LPC effect of recollection (Addante et al., 
2012a,b, Rugg & Curran, 2007) maximal over left parietal site CP5, t(54) = 4.05, 
p < .001. For source incorrect judgements, an FN400 effect was evident from 
400-600 ms at fronto-central site of Cz (t(54) = 2.85, p = .01), but there was no 
evidence of a reliable LPC effect at left parietal site of CP5 during the later 
latencies of 600-800 ms, as the source incorrect ERPs were not significantly 
different than correct rejections (t(54) = 1.98, p = .053) (Figure 10).  
The prior analyses established the viability for the current paradigm in 
successfully eliciting the standard, canonical ERP effects of familiarity and 
recollection (the FN400, and LPC, respectively), but because our goal of 
assessing ERPs for the Dunning Kruger Effect will require assessing effects that 
are non-traditional and otherwise relatively novel and unexplored, we also 
wanted to first establish that the current paradigm would be an effective platform 
from which to detect those kinds of effects.  
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Figure 10. Event-Related Potentials for Source Memory.  
ERPs of source correct judgements and source incorrect judgements compared 
to correct rejections at electrode site a) Cz and b) CP5. Bar graphs show the 
mean ERP amplitudes of source memory judgments for c) site Cz from 400-600 
ms and for d) site CP5 from 600-800ms. Compare to Addante et al., (2012), 
Neuroimage. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
 
For this reason, we also assessed the extent to which we could identify 
relatively novel ERP effects that were not the traditional ones for a memory task, 
and hence we analyzed a rare memory condition referred to as ‘context 
familiarity’, which has been reported earlier by Addante et al (2012a) for 
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combinations of item+source memory responses that varied for high and low item 
confidence while holding source memory accuracy constant.  
We assessed these conditions as compared to correct rejections, from 
400-600ms for item familiarity, from 600-800ms at Cp5 for recollection, and from 
800-1000ms at left frontal for context familiarity, as reported previously by 
Addante et al., (2012a). First, we replicated that high confidence item hits with 
correct source memory did elicit an LPC at a-priori electrode sites CP5, t(17) = 
2.40, p = .03, and post-hoc visual inspection of the data revealed that these 
differences were evident maximally at P4, t(17) = 3.32, p = .004. Next, we found 
evidence of a significant negative-going effect from 800-1000 ms at left frontal 
and frontal-central electrode sites that had been previously reported by Addante 
et al. (2012a) for context familiarity processing, thereby replicating those findings 
with a larger sample size in the current study. This effect was maximal at left-
frontal site F7, t(17) = -2.36, p = .03, and marginally significant at adjacent sites 
(Fc1, Fc5, and C3; representative site of Fc1: t(17) = -2.08, p = .053 (Figure 11)2. 
These results converge to replicate prior finding and give credence to the current 
paradigm’s ability to detect reliable ERPs effects for novel cognitive processes. 
 
                                                 
2 Similar to Addante et al (2012a), low confidence hits with correct source 
memory judgments did not exhibit an FN400 for item familiarity at any electrode 
site from 400-600 ms, nor exhibit any evidence of an LPC for recollection-related 
processing at CP5 from 600-800 ms, t(17) = 0.09, p = .93.  
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Figure 11. Event-Related Potentials for Contextual Familiarity.  
Topographic maps show a) high confidence item recognition with low confidence 
source judgments (Item 5 + Source 4) compared to correct rejections from 600-
800 ms and b) low confidence item recognition with low confidence source 
judgments compared to correct rejections from 800-1000 ms. The black dot in 
panel a indicates site P3 while the black dot in panel b indicates site FC1. c) 
ERPs show that an LPC effect is evident for Item 5 + Source 4 but not for Item 4 
+ Source 4 at CP5 from 600-800 ms. d) ERPs show that a negative-going effect 
is evident at FC1 from 800-1000 ms. The dashed box indicates the latencies of 
the ERP that represent statistically significant effects. The cross indicates 
latencies that are marginally significant. Compare to Addante et al., (2012), 
Neuroimage. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, † = p < .10. 
 
 
Dunning-Kruger Effect 
Because investigation into the electrophysiology of the DKE is novel and 
exploratory, the data were analyzed in several ways to probe several possible 
differences between judgements and cognitive strategies. First, we assessed for 
general differences that could be identified between the tasks of memory and 
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metacognition. To do this, we compared the ERPs for all memory judgements 
collapsed together and compared that to ERPs for decisions in all of the 
Dunning-Kruger related judgments (Figure 12).  
 
 
 
Figure 12. Comparison of Event-Related Potentials for Memory Judgments and 
Metacognitive Judgments Estimating Performance.  
a) Topographic maps of ERPs for all memory judgments compared to all 
Dunning-Kruger judgments. Each topographic map is range normalized 
according to their mean latencies. Warmer colors represent more positive-going 
voltage differences. b) ERPs for memory and metacognition tasks at central 
parietal site Pz. c) ERPs for memory and metacognition tasks at mid-frontal site 
Fz. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
 
This comparison revealed that activity for the metacognitive DKE 
decisions was significantly greater than those for memory judgements, starting 
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from approximately 300 ms and continuing through 1000 ms at almost every 
electrode site. These effects were maximal at the central parietal site of Pz 
through 800ms (300-500 ms: t(54) = 10.69, p < .001; 400-600 ms: t(54) = 15.19, 
p < .001; 600-900 ms: t(54) = 9.79, p < .001.), upon which time the effects 
became evident as maximal at mid-frontal site Fz from 900-1200 ms (t(54) = 
6.46, p < .001). This comparison was further examined by estimator group but no 
significant differences were found. 
 Are there differences in how different DKE groups were making their 
memory judgements? We next investigated physiological differences in memory 
as a function of the different DK groups (over-estimators, under-estimators, 
correct-estimators). Memory-related ERP effects (hits minus correct rejections, 
Figure 8 above) were analyzed as a function of DK group. At the 600 ms to 900 
ms latency that characterizes the LPC of recollection-related memory processing, 
five electrodes in the left parietal region (CP5, CP1, Pz, P3, and P7: P3 is 
reported as a representative electrode) had a significantly higher amplitude for 
the under-estimator group (M = 1.96, SD = 1.35) than the over-estimator group 
(M = 0.30, SD = 1.72), t(44)= 2.81; p = .01 (Figure 13).  
 
 
 64 
 
 
Figure 13. Difference Waves of Recognition Memory Event-Related Potential 
Effects for Dunning-Kruger Groups.  
Difference waves for memory effects (hits - correct rejections, e.g. Figure 7) for 
Dunning-Kruger groups of Over- and Under-Estimators at electrode a) Pz and d) 
P3. The dashed box indicates the latency that represents statistically significant 
effects. Topographic maps show differences in memory effects at a) Pz from 
400-600 ms and e) P3 from 600-900 ms. Each topographic map is range 
normalized according to their mean latencies. Warmer colors represent more 
positive-going voltage differences. Bar graphs show significant differences in 
mean ERP amplitude c) Pz from 400-600 ms and f) P3 from 600-900 ms. * p 
< .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
 
This finding suggests that the under-estimator group, which consists of the 
highest performing individuals, relied on using more recollection than the over-
estimator group in making memory judgments. Since the over-estimators 
constituted the lowest performing individuals, it is possible that one reason why 
they performed lower was because of lacking in recollection of those particular 
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trials. We also found that under-estimators had a significantly higher amplitude 
(M = 1.39, SD = 1.59) than over-estimators (M = 0.25, SD = 1.38) maximally at 
Pz, t(44)= 2.24; p = .03, but also significant at P3, t(44)= 2.18; p = .03, from 
400ms to 600ms. The difference was evident in the parietal region instead of the 
expected left frontal region characteristic of the FN400 (Figure 13). 
Next, we investigated differences in physiology for the respective DK 
metacognitive judgments estimating how one thought they were doing on the 
task (this comparison is with the total group, not split by estimator group). ERPs 
of self-estimates in the 69th percentile or less (responses of ‘1’ and ‘2’) were 
collapsed together as a general metric of low self-estimates and were found to be 
significantly different than the high self-estimate category that ranged from self-
estimates in the 80th percentile or above (responses of ‘4’ and ‘5’), maximally 
over electrode F8 from 600-900 ms, t(32) = -2.97, p = .006, but also significant at 
several adjacent electrode sites such as F4, t(32) = -2.54, p = .02. 
We probed the effect further to investigate the contributions of particular 
responses. We could not compare the highest self-estimates (judgments of ‘5’) to 
the lowest self-estimates (judgments of ‘1’) due to low sample size in both 
categories (N = 3 for responses of ‘1’, N = 2 for responses of ‘5’). Thus, we 
compared 80-89th percentile self-estimates (judgments of ‘4’, N = 19) to 60-69th 
percentile judgments (judgments of ‘2’, N = 10) and found that the significant 
difference persisted maximally over the right frontal electrode F8, t(27) = -3.02, p 
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= .01, but was also significant at several frontal sites such as F4, t(27) = -2.59, p 
= .02 (Figure 14). These effects did not differ when analyzed by estimator group. 
 
 
Figure 14. Event-Related Potentials Comparing High and Low Dunning-Kruger 
Self-Estimates.  
a) Topographic maps of Dunning-Kruger responses of ‘5’ and ‘4’ for all subjects 
compared to Dunning-Kruger responses of ‘1’ and ‘2’ and b) Dunning-Kruger 
response of ‘4’ compared to Dunning-Kruger responses of ‘2’ separately at 600-
900 ms. The black dot identifies electrode site F4 (where ERPs shown in panel b 
represent). c) and d) ERPs corresponding to each of the topographic maps are 
displayed directly to the right of their respective topography maps. The dashed 
box indicates the latency of the topographic map that represents statistically 
significant effects. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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How do metacognitive judgments differ among good and bad, over- and 
under- estimators? To investigate this question, we analyzed group level 
differences in ERPs between the over-, correct-, and under-estimators by DKE 
response (all responses collapsed together). There were significant differences in 
ERP amplitude between the under-estimators and over-estimators at left-frontal 
electrode F3 from 150-250 ms (MOver-Estimators = 5.09, SD = 3.08; MUnder-Estimators = 
2.93, SD = 2.18; t(44) = -2.07, p = .04) and at mid-frontal electrode Fz from 400-
600 ms (MOver-Estimators = 4.16, SD = 5.09; MUnder-Estimators = 0.55, SD = 4.40; t(44) = 
-2.03, p = .048), such that ERPs for over-estimators/under-performers were far 
more positive than that of the under-estimators/over-performers. Mean ERP 
amplitude was also significantly different between Correct-Estimators (M = -1.30, 
SD = 2.92) and Under-Estimators (M = 1.64, SD = 2.33) at central electrode Cz 
from 800-1200 ms, t(16) = 2.38, p = .03. 
This frontal effect at 400-600 ms may be characteristic of the FN400 ERP 
effect related to familiarity-based processing, in that over-estimators may be 
under-performing because they are relying on the less-specific memory process 
of familiarity to make their metacognitive judgments reflecting upon their past 
performance, instead of the recollection-related processes that appear to be 
supporting those who were found to be over-performing/under-estimating (Figure 
15). 
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Figure 15. Event-Related Potentials of Collapsed Dunning-Kruger Responses by 
Dunning-Kruger Group.  
Topographic maps show ERPs of collapsed Dunning-Kruger responses 
(Dunning-Kruger judgments 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 combined) for Over-Estimators 
compared to Under-Estimators from a) 150-250 ms and b) 400-600 ms and c) for 
Correct-Estimators compared to Under-Estimators from 800-1200 ms. Each 
topographic map is range normalized according to their mean latencies. Warmer 
colors represent more positive-going voltage differences. d), e), and f) show 
ERPs corresponding to each topographic map to left. g), h), and i) show bar 
graphs displaying the mean ERP amplitudes corresponding to each ERP and 
topographic map on the left. The dashed line indicates the time differences that 
ERPs are significantly different between the groups compared. * p < .05, ** p 
< .01, *** p < .001. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION 
Recognition and Source Memory Results 
 The primary goal of this experiment was to investigate the physiology of 
the DKE by using EEG to record brain activity during self-estimates of 
performance in an episodic memory task. However, to help establish the 
reliability of our physiological effects for the DKE (which is rather new and 
exploratory), it was important to show that our behavioral and physiological 
findings for memory were consistent with past research. We first review the 
results of the current study for measures of episodic memory, and then review 
the results for the Dunning-Kruger judgments.  
By using a well-established memory paradigm (Addante et al, 2011, 
2012a, 2012b; Addante, 2015; Roberts et al., 2018), we were able to replicate 
several memory effects in the literature. We first identified basic memory effects 
ubiquitous in the literature that old items are remembered better and responded 
to faster than new items (Tables 1 and 2), and that ERPs for these items were 
associated with the canonical effects of the FN400 and LPC that are traditionally 
viewed as the putative neural correlates of familiarity- and recollection-based 
memory processing (Figures 8 and 9) (e.g. Addante et al., 2012b; for reviews see 
Sanquist, 1980; Curran, 2000; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Friedman, 2013). We also 
identified behavioral and physiological effects for source memory, revealing that 
an FN400 effect was evident for both conditions of source correct and source 
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incorrect trials, but that the LPC was evident only for the source correct trials 
(Figure 10) consistent with earlier findings from this paradigm (Addante et al., 
2012a, b) and also consistent with theoretical models positing recollection and 
familiarity as dual processes of episodic memory (Yonelinas, 1999; 2002; 
Yonelinas et al., 2004; 2010).  
 The current study was also able to extend several recently-reported ERP 
effects of memory that have remained relatively unexplored in the field, and 
hence benefiting replication and extension in order to further understand these 
phenomena. In particular, Addante et al. (2012a) reported a novel late front-
parietal ERP effects described as “context familiarity” for instances in which 
participants provided low-confidence item memory hits that still had accurate 
source memory judgments for their studied task’s context. Our results replicated 
these findings, and did so with a larger sample size, in a different laboratory, and 
using a different subject population (Figure 10). The current study extended 
those physiological findings by also reporting behavioral measures of reaction 
times for the conditions of context familiarity, and contrasted that with 
recollection-related responses. This revealed reliable differences in how subjects 
were responding in these instances: participants responded faster to the high 
confidence recognized items than low confidence recognized items (Figure 4). 
This extends the ERP findings by demonstrating that they are not epiphenomenal 
and reflecting distinct cognitive processes retrieving memories of context that are 
independent of those with recollection (Addante et al., 2012a).  
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Together, these ERP and behavioral results replicating traditional 
memory-related effects in the data provide convergent evidence that our study 
was effective at eliciting the neural-correlates of memory processes such as 
recollection and familiarity. More importantly, they establish that our dataset can 
be used for novel explorations into metacognition-related physiology for which 
there is a much sparser ERP literature from which to draw comparisons. These 
findings give us confidence that the data set is reasonably uncontaminated by 
artifacts (such as blinking, eye saccades, and muscle activity), and is otherwise 
acceptable for further exploration in new domains.  
 
The Dunning-Kruger Effect 
Dunning-Kruger Behavioral Results  
To assess the DKE, we first sought to establish the viability of the adapted 
episodic memory paradigm for eliciting the canonical Dunning-Kruger pattern of 
results, which is a necessary and critical step. To our knowledge, the DKE has 
not been previously explored in episodic memory tasks, nor in other tasks using 
repeated self-estimate trials rather than a one-time post-test self-estimate (e.g. 
Dunning & Kruger, 1999). Our task employed Dunning-Kruger estimates 
interspersed throughout an on-going episodic memory test, which was an 
innovation in integrating these methodologies into behavioral tasks. The current 
study’s paradigm also permitted the collection of reaction times for Dunning-
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Kruger judgments that could be analyzed at a group level, which prior studies of 
the DKE had not been able to investigate due to their use of one-time measures.  
The results from our behavioral measures revealed that the memory 
paradigm was indeed successful at eliciting the DKE. Participants were 
separated into quartiles and their actual percentile ranking in the group was 
plotted alongside their estimated percentile ranking (Figure 5). The lowest 
performing participants in the bottom quartile were found to have drastically 
overestimated how highly they ranked in their groups while the highest 
performing participants underestimated their actual ranking. This basic finding 
was important to identify, and its establishment permitted us to continue to 
explore the data in more specific ways in both behavioral and 
electrophysiological domains. 
For measures of reaction time, over-estimators were discernably faster 
than under-estimators in judging themselves to be in the top percentile, but they 
were slower to judge themselves as being in the bottom percentile. There are 
three theoretical accounts that can be used to explain the reaction times for 
under- and over-estimators: cognition, social interactions, and the traditional 
Dunning-Kruger account of double ignorance (1999). 
The first account uses cognition for prototypes to explain the reaction time 
patterns. Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) results suggest that over-estimators do 
not understand that they are performing poorly and so they believe they are 
performing well and placing well within their participant group. This could lead to 
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them having a very positive perception about their ability to perform well on 
certain types of tasks. Research on prototypes has shown that answers to 
questions that are very obviously true (closest to one’s prototype) are answered 
faster (for example, the question, “Is a robin a bird?” will elicit a faster “yes” 
response than the questions “Is an ostrich a bird?” even though both are true) 
(Rosch, 1974; Collins & Quillian, 1969). Therefore, if a person’s perception of 
oneself (or prototype of themselves) includes that they perform well on tasks, 
they will be more likely to give a fast response when rating themselves well as 
opposed to rating themselves poorly. On the other hand, if they believe they are 
performing poorly, this perception would oppose the prototype that they have 
formed causing them to react slower to rating their performance negatively. The 
same may be true If under-estimators have formed a perception about 
themselves that they are only average or even below average. It would then be 
logical that they would be slow to rate themselves as being the best and quick to 
rate themselves as being less than the best. 
The second account by which the current findings for DKE reaction times 
could be viewed is the need to belong theory proposed by Baumeister and Leary 
(1995). The need to belong theory states that individuals have a need to form 
social attachments with other individuals and without such attachments, physical 
and/or mental consequences will ensue. The reaction time patterns found can be 
explained in this framework of desiring to maintain social attachments by being 
able to relate to others. Under-estimators are the individuals who perform better 
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than average; therefore, if they feel they are performing less than average, they 
may be faster to respond to attempt to prove they are like the in-group. However, 
if they are performing well, they may respond slower to rating themselves in the 
top percentile for fear of being ostracized. Over-estimators may have the same 
mentality. They are the individuals who perform less than average and if they feel 
they are performing better than average, will respond faster to be accepted by 
the group and seen as smart. Otherwise, if they feel they are not performing well, 
they may be slower to respond for fear of being disliked because of their low 
performance. 
The third account that the reaction time results can also be explained is by 
using Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) model of double ignorance of low performers 
(i.e. 1. They do not know the answer, 2. They do not know they are ignorant of 
the answer) together with the inability of high performers to estimate their place 
among their peers due to not realizing the weaknesses of their peer group. By 
this account, over-estimators would be fast to report that they are doing well 
because they believe they are actually doing well, while they are slow to report 
that they are performing poorly because they do not believe they usually perform 
poorly or do not want to admit to themselves that they are performing poorly. 
Dunning-Kruger Physiology  
We began exploring the neurophysiology of the DKE by examining brain 
activity for general differences in processing between the memory and 
metacognition tasks; that is, assessing the extent to which these two judgment 
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types could be established as reflecting different kinds of processing. We 
assessed ERPs between all memory trials versus all self-estimates, and they 
were found to be different beginning from approximately 300 ms into the epoch 
and continuing throughout the epoch to 1200 ms at almost every electrode site, 
but being maximal first at posterior parietal sites and then later at mid-frontal 
regions (Figure 12). This indicated that subjects were processing the 
metacognitive judgments of the DKE in substantively different ways than a 
baseline condition of memory-based stimulus processing, and revealed that our 
paradigm could reliably detect these differences with the available trial counts of 
DK judgments and the precision of the ERPs.  
The pattern of the ERPs (Figure 12) indicated that the large centro-parietal 
and mid-frontal effects, respectively, were reflecting patterns consistent with 
established properties of the P300 ERP effect, or P3a and P3b effects, that are 
known to have the same distributions of topography and latency, and which have 
been well-established as being associated with novelty processing (Dien, 
Spencer, & Donchin, 2003; Otten & Donchin, 2000; Simons, Graham, Miles, & 
Chen, 2001). This is consistent with the paradigm in that the DKE judgments 
were uncommon trials that appeared among the common memory trials in the 
test, and would have been salient stimuli for eliciting an orienting effect of 
attention as a novelty item (Kishiyama, Yonelinas, & Lazzara, 2006; Knight, 
1996; Knight & Scabini, 1998).  
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Having established that the paradigm had sufficient signal-to-noise 
sensitivity for successfully identifying the physiology associated with DKE 
judgments, we next explored whether these different metacognitive judgments 
were associated with differential ERP patterns. When brain activity of all 
Dunning-Kruger responses were investigated together, over-estimators were 
found to have a higher mean ERP amplitude than under-estimators at frontal 
electrode sites during 400-600 ms (Figure 15). ERP effects varied as a function 
of whether people were performing well or performing poorly, suggesting that 
these ‘perceptions of grandeur’ may be caused by an over-reliance on a sense of 
familiarity, as opposed to recollecting the clear details of their past encounters 
from which to guide the proper placement of the perceptual judgments. Under-
estimators, on the other hand, exhibited a larger LPC than over-estimators did 
from 600-900ms during memory judgments (hits to correct rejections; Figure 13), 
indicating that these humble under-estimators may be estimating their 
performance by reliance upon the clearer details of recollected information, as 
opposed to the fuzzy sense of familiarity that can come with less accuracy 
(Yonelinas et al., 2004; 2010). 
Implications 
This experiment had several novel contributions to the understanding of 
the DKE. First, this is the only Dunning-Kruger experiment, to our knowledge, in 
which self-estimates relative to a peer group were recorded repeatedly 
throughout the task. That is, normally, self-estimates in prior studies are only 
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acquired once: at the end of the task (Adams & Adams, 1960; Burson, Larrick, & 
Klayman, 2006; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Oskamp, 
1965; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2017; Ryvkin, Krajč, & Ortmann, 
2012a; Sanchez & Dunning, 2018) although there was a variation of the task 
using repeated estimates before the task itself (Simons, 2013). This novel 
adjustment to the classic Dunning-Kruger paradigm was critical to collecting both 
reaction time measures and brain activity during the metacognitive self-
estimates. 
Our finding that under-estimators had a larger LPC than over-estimators is 
a novel finding and gives some insight into the inaccurate estimates that occur in 
over-estimators. Because the over-estimators (under-performers) had a smaller 
LPC, this finding suggests that they used less recollection during episodic 
memory retrieval. It is then logical to suggest that their memories for episodic 
events were diminished as well, leading to more inaccuracies when trying to 
recall episodic events related to their performance. 
We also found evidence of differences in brain activity between under-
estimators and over-estimators when collapsing brain activity for all Dunning-
Kruger metacognitive responses. Over-estimators had a larger ERP mean 
amplitude than under-estimators at mid-frontal electrode sites from 400-600ms, 
which is the characteristic position and latency of the FN400 that has been 
synonymous with familiarity in many prior studies (Addante et al., 2012; Curran, 
2000; Friedman, 2013; Gherman & Philiastides, 2015; Rugg et al., 1998; Rugg & 
 78 
 
Curran, 2007). In the framework of a memory-related interpretation of these 
results, one could argue that because we found an FN400 in this condition, over-
estimators may have relied more upon familiarity than under-estimators in 
making these judgments, in lieu of the recollections that under-estimators were 
evidently relying upon instead. That is, each group was arriving at fundamentally 
different metacognitive conclusions because they were relying upon, or being 
influenced by, fundamentally different neurocognitive processes of memory.  
Limitations and Considerations for Future Research 
Interpreting ERP findings of FN400 and LPC effects should always be 
doen with caution, relative to experimental conditions and inherent constraints 
(Paller, Lucas, & Voss., 2012; Voss, Lucas, & Paller, 2012); this remains true 
when interpreting ERPs associated with Dunning-Kruger judgments. An 
important consideration is to avoid an over-reliance on reverse inference, since 
effects like the FN400 have also been characterized as including contributions of 
other cognitive processes such as implicit fluency and conceptual priming (Voss 
& Paller, 2010, 2012; Leynes & Zish, 2012; Leynes & Addante, 2016). For these 
and other reasons, we believe that the current work, while provocative, is best 
viewed as motivating future research that can further investigate these effects, 
extend them, and test them against competing hypotheses.  
There were some limitations in the design of the current study that could 
be addressed in future research. The scale that was used to report percentile 
self-estimates was limited to five button presses. The reason why the Dunning-
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Kruger estimates used a five-point scale was because we sought to keep 
response options easy for participants using the same 5-point scale in the 
memory judgments. However, that meant that the lowest participants could 
indicate their percentile ranking was 59th percent and below which is more than 
half of the scale. Previous research on the better-than-average effect (Alicke & 
Govorun, 2005; Brown, 2012) has shown that participants are motivated to rate 
themselves more highly than other individuals, especially on important matters. 
Therefore, this effect gives support to the validity of our scale but we recognize 
that a considerable amount of sensitivity is lost due to this adapted scale.  
In addition, anchoring effects may have played a role in determining which 
buttons participants pressed. Anchoring effects occur when answers remain 
close to offered information and correct answers are not searched for when far 
away from initially offered choices (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Though it would be impractical to expect naturalistic subjects 
to necessarily have an equal distribution of honest responses across our scale, 
participants pressed ‘1’ and ‘5’ much less often than ‘2’, ‘3’, or ‘4. This may have 
been due to anchoring effects because participants were told to fixate on the 
middle of the screen to avoid eye movements and the response of ‘3’ was shown 
in the middle of the screen. Therefore, participants may have anchored onto ‘3’ 
which could explain why it was the most chosen response.  
One way to address both of these issues in future research is to have 
participants speak their estimated percentile ranking using a digital microphone, 
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(i.e.: the SV-1 Voice Key https://www.cedrus.com/sv1/), that is engineered to 
record precise reaction times by logging when a sound above a certain threshold 
is reached. Our lab has recently developed procedures for doing this in ERP 
studies of cued-recall in episodic memory (Sirianni & Addante, 2019; manuscript 
in preparation). In future work utilizing such designs, participants could be given 
a prompt on the screen to speak their estimated percentile ranking on a scale of 
0 to 99, which would provide a more sensitive scale and possibly even better 
resolution of DKE estimates than our current Likert scale options much the way 
that improved resolution measures have revealed insightful advances in 
understanding working memory (Koen, et. al., 2017; Kolarik, et al., 2017; 
Yonelinas, 2013; Zhang & Luck, 2008, 2015).  
Summary and Conclusions 
By establishing that we can extend the DKE to studies of episodic 
memory, in which we can measure both response speeds and physiology 
occurring over multiple samples, we were able to identify physiological correlates 
that distinguished Dunning-Kruger responding. These findings of differing 
physiology between under- and over-estimators have large implications for the 
field of social cognition. By investigating the underlying neural correlates of this 
effect, we can begin to categorize exactly why or how such illusory errors of 
metacognition are occurring. Our finding that over-estimators (under-performers) 
have a smaller LPC related to recollection-based processing introduces the 
possibility of developing countermeasures to improve their memory (such as 
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entrainment devices known to improve memory in our paradigm (Roberts et al., 
2018)) or non-invasive brain stimulation such as transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) and investigate if their self-estimates improve in accuracy with 
better memory (Boudewyn, Roberts, Mizrak, Ranganath, & Carter, 2018; 
Cappiello, Xie, David, Bikson, & Zhang, 2016; Mizrak et al., 2018). More 
experimentation is needed to assess exactly what cognitive processes are being 
employed, but the present work may constitute an important first step in 
identifying them. 
The current study thus represents a step forward in understanding one of 
the most pervasive observations about human behavior: persistent metacognitive 
illusions that cause us to both over-estimate and under-estimate our 
performances. Those who tend to perform best often under-estimate, whereas 
those who perform worst tend to over-estimate the most. This pernicious pattern 
has been observed by thinkers from Aristotle to Confucius and throughout the 
modern age. The basic premise of the DKE - that we have inherent illusions of 
metacognition and self-assessment- is thus a fundamental force that shapes our 
psychological universe in much the way that gravity is a fundamental force that 
shapes our physical universe. As gravity works to shape our physical world, our 
abilities to make metacognitive assessments of ourselves can likewise be seen 
as one of the parallel natural forces at work in shaping our own psychological 
universe. The effect is timeless, discriminates upon no one, and affects everyone 
at some point, large or small. Overcoming these psychological errors is possible, 
 82 
 
but like overcoming gravity, it takes energy, resources, and concerted effort, and 
then persists only for transient moments in time until returning back to baseline 
levels.  
In conclusion, empirical investigations into the DKE have to date been 
limited to behavioral measures of simple tasks that collected only one 
metacognitive judgment per task, and that lacked any physiological measures of 
the neurocognitive processes underlying this phenomenon. The current study 
adds to the literature in several ways: First, it represents the first known 
physiological recordings of the DKE. Second, this was made possible by using 
an integrative new paradigm that permitted multiple recurring trials of Dunning-
Kruger metacognitive judgments. Third, this paradigmatic innovation made it 
possible to capture the DKE in a complex episodic memory task which extends 
the body of work on the DKE from logic and math problems used in prior studies. 
Fourth, the current study also contributed the first known behavioral data 
measuring reaction times for these metacognitive decisions, providing revealing 
insight into why people differ in this phenomenon. We hope that this work can 
inspire new explorations to discover the neural correlates of our psychological 
processes, with the overarching goal of better understanding human behavior 
and cognition. 
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